

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16723

1963

Sec. 2. In accordance with the provisions of national security action memorandum No. 220 of February 5, 1963, the following vessels which called at Cuba after January 1, 1963, have reacquired eligibility to carry U.S. Government-financed cargoes from the United States by virtue of the persons who control the vessels having given satisfactory certification and assurance that no ships under their control will, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the U.S. Government to discourage such trade:

- (a) Since last report: None.
(b) Previous reports:

Flag of registry:

	Number of ships
British.....	2
Danish.....	1
German (West).....	1
Greek.....	1
Norwegian.....	1

Sec. 3. The ships listed in sections 1 and 2 have made the following number of trips to Cuba in 1963, based on information received through September 6, 1963:

Flag of registry	Number of trips									
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Total
British.....	5	8	9	17	12	15	14	11	1	92
Greek.....	4	6	8	8	17	12	17	6		78
Lebanese.....	1		2	3	8	9	8	3	1	40
Norwegian.....		2	1		1	2	1	2		12
Italian.....	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	1		13
Yugoslav.....		1	2	1	1		1	1		4
Spanish.....			1							1
French.....			1			1			1	1
German (West).....					1					1
Japanese.....	1					1	1	1		4
Moroccan.....			1			1		1		3
Swedish.....				1		1		1		3
Subtotal.....	12	18	30	27	44	43	46	27	3	250
Polish.....	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1		11
Grand total.....	14	20	30	29	46	45	46	28	3	261

Note.—Trip totals in this section exceed ship totals in sections 1 and 2 because some of the ships made more than one trip to Cuba.

Dated: September 10, 1963.

GEORGE R. GRANT, JR.,
Acting Deputy Maritime Administrator.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, I rise today to take myself out of the ranks of the "uncommitted," with reference to the question of Senate approval of the test ban treaty, and to announce that I intend to vote "nay" on this question.

I take this position with great reluctance, because I have sincerely hoped that in good conscience I could support the treaty. No one is more eager than I for a relaxation of world tensions and for a step—however small—toward peace with honor. And I would gladly vote for approval of this treaty if it provided for adequate inspection.

Even though the vote, as always, will be determined by the yeas and nays, the doubts and the uncertainties and the hopes and the prayers do not lend themselves to a clearcut decision. All we can hope for is that the weight of the decision will best be borne by each Senator as his own conscience dictates. Even though this issue divides us, our common objective is an enduring peace.

For more than a week the Senate has been engaged in debate on the question of Senate approval of this treaty—perhaps the most important and far-reaching question to be before this body since World War II. Both the proponents and the opponents of the treaty have

been heard; many speeches have been made, and many pledges, either for or against the treaty, have been given.

Many Senators who have taken the Senate floor to speak either for or against the treaty have eminently more knowledge than I have about the present military posture of our country, how it compares with that of the Soviet Union, and the effect the treaty could have on its future.

Not having served on any Senate committee which dealt directly with the treaty, I found myself in a position comparable in many ways to that of a layman who would be called upon to make a decision as to how to cast his vote. To compensate for this, I have done what I am sure all other Senators have done—read all the testimony available to me; spoken at length with men such as Ambassador Averell Harriman, an avid supporter of treaty; and talked as much as possible with men such as Dr. Edward Teller, a dedicated and sincere opponent of the treaty in its present form.

Because I always like to approach a problem positively, I began making a list of all the reasons why this country should, with the advice and consent of the Senate, become a party to this treaty. That was—and still is—an almost impossible job, although not for the reason some may think—namely, that the list is long and involved with many explanations. On the contrary, the list is extremely short; and the advantages involved almost defy definition in plain English, and are qualified time after time. For the most part, even those who espouse these reasons seem to have grave doubts about their credibility.

My list was gleaned primarily from the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee. Incidentally, I would venture to guess that out of some 1010 pages of testimony and statements,

not more than 75 widely-scattered pages are devoted to reasons why we should approve this treaty. All the rest deal with refuting, examining, explaining away, and delineating the many disadvantages that could accrue to this country. This fact alone is quite significant. We have had no problem of finding out what the treaty does not do; the problem has been in pinpointing just what it does do.

Here is my list of the things its proponents say it does:

First. The treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons.

Second. The treaty will help slow down the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Third. The treaty will ease tension in the world and create a better atmosphere that would be conducive to the establishment of peace, in contrast to a nuclear war; or—as stated differently by some proponents, but essentially the same thing—the treaty will open up new paths toward future agreements between the free world and the Communist world.

Fourth. The treaty must be approved by the Senate, because its rejection at this point would cause world opinion to turn violently against the United States. It is practically impossible to find this reason stated in plain language by any backers of the treaty. But, in my opinion, it is one of the most important of all the threads which run throughout all the proponents' thinking.

Fifth. The treaty will reduce the radioactive pollution of the planet.

Mr. President, let us examine, one by one, the five points put forward by the proponents.

I ask my colleagues to bear in mind that each time I shall quote a statement in regard to these five points, it will be a statement made by a proponent of the treaty. If I had wanted to refute these five points, I could have found many statements to do that. I could have turned to what the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has said. As the highly respected and eminently capable chairman of the Armed Services Committee for many years, his opinion in U.S. military matters is seldom challenged. Or I could have quoted another great Senator, the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], who, as chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, has for many months been holding hearings on the whole realm of a test ban treaty. Also, I could have leaned on the many sound statements made by a member of my own political party, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], who, as a major general in the Air Force Reserve, is also knowledgeable in such matters.

I did not do this.

My intent is to be as objective as possible. So I turned to the testimony of high-ranking officials, competent scientists, and dedicated military leaders who, I knew, favored this test ban treaty. I wanted to see what they thought the treaty really would do—what they listed on the "pro" side of the ledger. I shall now proceed to state what some of these proponents say in reference to the five things the treaty is purported to do: